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The study of expert behaviour has attracted widespread 
attention since the seminal work of de Groot (1965) and 
Chase and Simon (1973). Of particular interest is how ex-
perts, even under time pressure, can make relatively good 
decisions in spite of strong limits in their computational 
capacities. A substantial amount of research has focused on 
chess playing, as this domain offers a well-validated and 
ecological measure of expertise (the Elo rating). Obviously, 
this question has important repercussions beyond game 
playing, and extensive research has been carried out about 
decision making in domains such as fire fighting, medical 
diagnosis, and aviation (e.g., Zsambok & Klein, 1997). 
While the importance of both recognition and search 
mechanisms is generally accepted, researchers disagree as to 
their relative importance. De Groot (1965) showed that even 
chess grandmasters seldom look at more than 100 possible 
continuations of the game before choosing a move. This 
number is vastly smaller than the number of legal moves (on 
average, for a middlegame position, the number of legal 
continuations six ply deep is about 1.8 billion, and increases 
exponentially for greater depths). De Groot (1965) also 
found that top-level grandmasters do not search reliably 
deeper than candidate masters, although more recent data 
suggest that masters search slightly deeper, on average, than 
weak amateurs (e.g., Gobet, 1998). De Groot (1965) as well 
as Chase and Simon (1973) propose that recognition, by 
allowing knowledge to be accessed rapidly, enables look-
ahead search to be highly selective. Holding (1985), by 
contrast, argued that the main determinant of chess skill is 
the ability to plan ahead by search, rather than reliance on 
recognition of positional patterns.   
Support for the role of pattern recognition in expert 
behaviour comes from two main lines of research: (a) 
perception and memory, and (b) decision making. Evidence 
from perception and memory indicates that experts can 
rapidly recognize the key features of a problem, and that 
there are important differences between experts’ and non-
experts’ eye-movements (de Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 
de Voogt & Retschitzki, in press). Research has also shown 
that experts have a remarkable memory for domain-specific 
material (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965; de Groot 
& Gobet, 1996). Interestingly, their superiority extends to 
the recall of random positions, although the skill difference 
is then much smaller than with game positions. CHREST, a 
detailed computer model of pattern recognition, has 
accounted for these results (de Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet 
& Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003). 
The second line of evidence comes from rapid decision 
making (e.g., Zsambok & Klein, 1997). In particular, 
research with chess players suggests that grandmasters can 
play at a high level even under severe time pressure (e.g., 
Gobet & Simon, 1996). SEARCH, a computational model 
based on CHREST, accounts for several data from expert 
problem solving, such as how average depth of search 
increases as a function of skill (Gobet, 1997). 
Recently, proponents of the predominant role of search 
processes have collected data aiming at undermining the 
importance of pattern recognition. In particular, Chabris and 
Hearst (2003), using data from rapid chess and blindfold 
chess, have questioned Chase and Simon’s (1973) and 
Gobet and Simon’s (1996) account. In this talk, I’ll show 
that Chabris and Hearst’s (2003) data, far from invalidating 
theories based on pattern recognition and selective search, 
actually support them. 
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